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CASE COMMENTS

SPEEDY TRIAL: COMPETENCY EXAM AS WAIVER
Chester v. State, 298 So. 2d 529 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974)
Petitioner was arrested September 9, 1972, and charged with first degree
murder.? One hundred days after the arrest petitioner's motion for an examination to determine mental competency to stand trial was granted. 2 He was subsequently found competent. 3 On August 16, 1973, petitioner moved for discharge under Florida's speedy trial rule.4 This motion was denied and trial was
set for September 18, 1973. On that date, but prior to commencement of trial,
petitioner again moved for discharge. 5 The motion was also denied, and
petitioner was found guilty of first degree murder. On appeal, Florida's Third
District Court of Appeal HELD, petitioner had waived his right to a speedy
trial by moving for an examination to determine mental competency. 6
The right of an accused to a speedy trial is a fundamental element of his
constitutional protection.? Because the speedy trial is a vague concept, however, courts have had difficulty interpreting the right.8 Defendants and
prosecutors must be afforded sufficient time to prepare their cases, but excessive
time may be disadvantageous to either party. Accordingly, courts have avoided
defining excessive time in absolute terms, preferring to treat each case individually. 9 Nevertheless, even a case-by-case approach has necessitated development of some criteria. Recognizing that a speedy trial requires a balance
between the needs of the accused and the interests of society,o courts have
1. 298 So. 2d 529, 530 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
2. Id. An indictment was returned on Nov. 14, 1972, and on Dec. 5 the state filed an
information charging the same offense. Petitioner's motion was made Dec. 18, 1973, 13 days
after the information was filed.
8. Id. The report finding petitioner competent was filed March 21, 1973. The examination required 93 days to complete.
4. FLA. R. CRnt. P. 3.191 allows motion for discharge if the accused has not been brought
to trial within 180 days of arrest. On Aug. 16 petitioner had been held 341 days.
5. 298 So. 2d at 530. On the trial date petitioner had been held 374 days.
6. Id.
7. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967). The right to a speedy trial is
ancient, being first referred to in the Magna Carta. "We will sell to no man, we will not
deny or defer to any man either justice or right." Id., citing King John's Charter of 1215, c.
29. The right is also guaranteed by the United States Constitution. U.S. CONsr. amend. VI
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial." Every state has recognized the right by either constitutional provision, statute,
or judicial precedent. See generally Note, Right to a Speedy Trial, 57 COLUm. L. Ra,. 846
(1957).
8. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521-22 (1972), the Court called the right "slippery"
and stated that it is impossible to do more than generalize about it, so dependent is it on
the peculiar circumstances of each case.
9. Id. See also Medina v. People, 154 Colo. 4, 387 P.2d 733 (1967), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
848 (1968). In Medina the court held speedy trial to be a matter of judicial discretion because the right is relative, and court conditions and actions of both the accused and the
prosecution actions must be considered.
10. 407 U.S. at 519-20. The Barker Court held that the speedy trial right is generically
different from other constitutional rights of the accused because of the societal interest in
assuring prompt trial. The Court defined the societal interest by stating: "The inability of
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tried to insure that the right is exercised "not

. .
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. as a sword for defendant's

escape, but as a shield for his protection."'1 The result of this concern has
been the demand-waiver concept.12
Originally the demand-waiver doctrine developed from the recognition that
the speedy trial right was personal to the accused and therefore waivable." If

the defendant did not exercise his right, he waived it. Judicial expansion of
the concept led to inferences of waiver when defendant delayed trial or even
when he failed to object to prosecutorial delays.14 Waiver of a speedy trial
under the demand-waiver doctrine was not required to be voluntary and informed, as was waiver of other rights,'5 and mere inaction was construed as
total waiver.16 The rationale of courts in adopting demand-waiver was that
7
delay was beneficial to the accused.'
The assumption that delay was not necessarily disadvantageous to the accused led to a further dilution of the speedy trial right, known as the prejudicial delay criterion.' Under this standard the speedy trial right was held
to protect the accused only from oppressive or arbitrary delays.' 9 For a delay
to be oppressive the accused was required to show actual prejudice to his
case. 20 Lacking this proof, time lapses as great as ten years have been held not
a denial of speedy trial.21

the courts to provide a prompt. trial has contributed to a large backlog of cases in urban
courts which, among other things, enables defendants to negotiate more effectively pleas of
guilty to lesser offenses and otherwise manipulate the system. In addition, persons released
on bond for lengthy periods awaiting trial have an opportunity to commit other crimes ...
Moreover, the longer the accused is free awaiting trial, the more tempting becomes his opportunity to jump bail . . . . Finally, delay between arrest and punishment may have a
detrimental effect on rehabilitation." (Footnotes omitted.)
11. United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 880
(1958), citing Note, supra note 7, at 853.
12. See Note, Speedy Trial Schemes and Criminal Justice Delay, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 794,
799 (1972).
13. See, e.g., Collins v. United States, 157 F.2d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1946).
14. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 73 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1954).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 398 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1080 (1969). In Perez the defendant was held to have waived his right by nonassertion even
though he was not represented by counsel at the time he should have made his demand and
neither the court nor the prosecution informed him of his right.
16. See Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REV. 1587, 1610 (1965).
See also Kelly v. State, 54 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1951).
17. "The demand doctrine presupposes that failure to demand trial is a deliberate choice
for supposed advantage on the assumption that delay always benefits the accused." Note,
supra note 16, at 1610.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., State v. Patton, 260 N.C. 359, 132 S.E.2d 891 (1963); Harge v. Turner, 404
P.2d 683 (Okla. 1965).
20. See, e.g., State v. Jestes, 448 P.2d 917 (Wash. 1968).
21. State v. Alter, 67 Wash. 2d 111, 406 P.2d 765 (1965). In Alter 10 years lapsed between indictment and trial. The defendant claimed prejudice because the possibility of
producing defense witnesses was eliminated. The court, however, stated that the defendant
had not proved the witnesses were necessary to his defense and so had not proved prejudice.
Therefore, the delay had not contravened defendant's right to a speedy trial.
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Although the United States Supreme Court has rarely considered the right
of speedy trial, 22 in 1972 it directly confronted the demand-waiver doctrine and
prejudicial delay criterion in the case of Barker v. Wingo. 23 Although in
Barker the defendant had neither asserted his right to a. speedy trial nor
proved prejudice to his case resulting from the five-year delay,24 the Court refused to apply strict demand-waiver doctrine, stating that such involuntary
waiver was inconsistent with its earlier rulings concerning waiver of rights. 25
At the same time, the Court refused to accept the assumption that delay
is necessarily advantageous to the defendant absent a showing of actual
prejudice.26 Instead, the Court devised a test in which four criteria: the assertion of defendant's rights, prejudice, the length of delay, and the reasons for
2
the delay, must be weighedY.
Under the Barker formulation, no one element
would be sufficient to prove denial of the right, 28 but neither would nonassertion standing alone excuse indefinite delay.29 Therefore, Barker repudiated
the demand-waiver doctrine. 0
While the courts struggled to define the speedy trial right, the American
Bar Association included Speedy Trial Standards among its Standards for Administration of Criminal Justice.31 The ABA approached the speedy trial
problem in a different manner from the courts, stating that the right should
be affirmatively defined as a fixed period of time from arrest or indictment to
trial.3 2 Florida became one of three states to implement ABA standards when,

22. 407 U.S. at 515. For Supreme Court decisions dealing with speedy trial prior to
Barker, see United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30
(1970); Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354

(1957); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1904).
23. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
24. Id. at 519.

25. Id. at 525.
26. Id. at 532. The Court defined prejudice in terms of the interests of the accused that
a speedy'trial is designed to protec.-The Court listed prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimization of anxiety and concern of the accused, and limitation of the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Traditional prejudice theory centers on the.third
interest, impairment of the defense. See note 21 supra.
27. 407 U.S. at 530. The Court stated that the length of delay element is the triggering
mechanism. Lacking delay, no claim of denial can be made. The Court indicated a relationship between tolerable delay and seriousness of the crime such that less serious and complex
crimes support shorter delay than do more serious and complex crimes. In discussing reasons
for delay the Court noted that a scale of allowance should be used. Deliberate attempts to
impair the defense are unallowable and should weigh heavily against the State while delays
such as missing witnesses are excusable and should be treated accordingly.
28. 407 U.S. at 533.
29. Id. at 531. The Court stated, however, that failure to assert his right should weigh
heavily against a defendant. In Barker the failure to assert was the most serious impairment
of defendant's claim, outweighing the length of delay. Id. at 534-35.
30. Id. at 525. The Court stated: "Such an approach, by presuming waiver of a fundamental right from inaction, is inconsistent with this Court's pronouncements on waiver of
rights."
31. See ABA Standards,Speedy Trial §§1.1-4.2 (Approved Draft 1968).
32. Id. §23.
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in 197 133 the state supreme court promulgated rule 3.191 of the Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure.34 This rule, which is operative even where the right
is not asserted, requires that a defendant accused of a felony be brought to trial
within 180 days of the date he is taken into custody, unless he demands to be
tried within sixty days.35 Although the rule provides that certain prosecutorial
delays can be excused and time extended,36 the grounds for excuse are strictly
limited. 7 Unexcused prosecutorial delays entitle the accused to move for
absolute discharge.38
Delays attributable to the accused may also be either excused or unexcused
according to the rule.3 9 The Florida supreme court held in State ex rel. Butler
v. Cullen40 that unexcused delays on the part of the accused constitute waiver
of his right to a speedy trial, although not an absolute waiver. In Butler the
accused demanded a speedy trial under the Florida rule, thus requiring the
state to bring him to trial within sixty days of the demand. 41 Subsequently,
the accused withdrew his demand and requested an extension of time to prepare his defense. When defendant appealed his conviction the supreme court
held the 180 day rule inapplicable because of the defendant's actions. Instead,
the court ruled that a defendant may reassert his right to a speedy trial after
180 days but the motion may be denied and the state is required to bring him
42
to trial within ninety days of the date of his motion.
The Butler rule applies to those delays attributable to the defendant but
unexcused by the rule. Delays caused by the defendant and classified by the
rule as excused were considered in Parks v. State4 3 in which the Third District
Court of Appeal ruled that such delays merely extended the allowed time
period. In Parks defendant moved for an examination to determine mental
competency to stand triala 4 The examination was allowed and he was found
competent. Defendant moved for discharge under Florida's speedy trial rule
but such discharge was denied. Defendant appealed his conviction on the basis
of denial of speedy trial. The court found that the defendant was held for 211
days, but that twenty-seven days, the time required for the mental examination,
should be excluded from the 180 day rule. The remaining 184 days were found
33. See Progress Report of Section of Criminal Law in Connection with Its Responsibilities for Implementation of ABA Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice, 8 AM.
CRIm. L.Q. 178 (1970). Florida's former speedy trial rules were a combination of statute and
court rule. The other two states were Texas, a statute state, and Arizona, a court rule state.
34. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 245 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1971).
35. FLA. R. CIMu. P. 3.191(a)(1), (2). The 60-day limit available on demand requires that
the accused be brought to trial within 60 days of the date of demand. A demand cannot be
made until an indictment or an information is filed. The 180-day default time for those accused of felonies operates without any assertion of the right.
36. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(f).
37. Id.
38. FLA. R. CRITN.P. 3.191(d)(1).
39. FLA. R. CRINI. P. 3.191(d)(2).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971).
Id. at 863.
Id. at 864.
278 So. 2d 332 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
Id. at 333.
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reasonable because the trial court was required to hold a competency hearing,
the time for which was not included in the twenty-seven day extension. 45 The
court thus held that the defendant was not denied speedy trial.
In the instant case petitioner based his appeal on the Parks rule but the
Third District Court of Appeal declined to apply Parks. Instead, the court
applied the Butler rule, stating that petitioner waived his rights by moving
for the delay. 46 Applying the Butler analysis the court noted that no formal
demand for a speedy trial had been made after completion of the examination.
Without discussing the Butler ninety-day rule, the court went on to apply the
balancing test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v.
Wingo.47 Finding that ninety-three days of the 374-day delay were attributable
to defendant's delay, and that defendant had alleged no prejudice to his case
resulting from the delay, the court held that he had not been denied a speedy
trial. 48 The court did not discuss any reason for the additional 281 day delay
49
not attributable to the defendant's motion.
Dissenting in the instant case, Judge Carroll set forth three primary contentions. First, he argued that the Florida rule's treatment of time extensions
indicates that the Parks rule is more applicable to the instant case than the
Butler rule.5 0 Second, he stated that if the Butler rule is applicable, then the
whole rule, including the ninety-day provision, must apply. 51 Finally, he
45.

Id.

46. 298 So. 2d at 530. Under the Parks rule the court would have been required to exclude the 93-day period of the competency examination from the 374 day total. The resulting
281-day delay would then have to be found reasonable in relation to the 180-day rule. The
Butler decision required no such examination of unreasonableness in relation to the 180-day
rule because the rule was waived. Butler required reasonableness only after reassertion of
the right to speedy trial either by demand or by motion for discharge.
47. The majority opinion failed to mention the 90-days test. The only discussion of it
occurred in the dissent, where Judge Carroll objected to the court's not reaching the issue
at all, stating: "[W]here the prescribed time is waived by a defendant's motion . . . a
reasonable time within which he must be brought to trial is .

.

. 90 days ....

By affirming

denial of the motion for discharge the majority necessarily hold that 181 days ... is reasonable." Id. at 533.
48. The court's analysis of the instant case in terms of the Barker test indicates that the
majority found the Florida rule totally waived when the competency examination was requested.
49. An additional issue discussed by the Court was whether petitioner had voluntarily
waived his rights. The majority seemed to think that he had done so through his counsel's
statements. The dissent argued that voluntary waiver must be written and signed by the
defendant or by counsel under Florida rule 3.191(d)(2). Although the voluntary waiver was
supposed to have taken place during the examination to determine competency to stand
trial, neither the majority nor the dissent reached the interesting question of whether an
accused undergoing an examination of mental competency can voluntarily waive his rights.
50. Judge Carroll labeled the holding of the instant case and the application of the
Butler rule a misreading of Florida rule 3.191(d)(2). The rule reads in part: "The time
periods established by this Rule for trial may at any time be waived or extended by order
of the court . .. [for] . .. ( V) a period of reasonable and necessary delay resulting from
proceedings including but not limited to an examination and hearing to determine the
mental competency or physical ability of the defendant to stand trial.... For purposes of
this Rule any other delay shall be unexcused."
51.

See note 47 supra.
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pointed out that the majority's treatment of delay for determination of competency as unexcused will have a chilling effect on an accused's right to an ex52
amination, a right "vital to due process of law."
The majority opinion in the instant case assigned Butler as precedent,
ignoring Parks, a prior decision of the same court that heard the instant appeal. Butler, however, dealt with a case in which a demand for trial within
sixty days was made and then withdrawn. According to the Florida rule, demand "binds the accused and the state."' 3 The rule explicitly states that "a
person who has demanded a speedy trial, who thereafter is not prepared for
trial is not entitled to continuance or delay."5 4 The Butler facts, a demand
followed by delay, are exactly what the rule disallows. In the instant case no
sixty-day demand was made, and therefore the rule pertaining to the effect of
demand does not apply. Furthermore, the rule expressly provides for extension
of time, when no time demand has been made, for delays such as competency
determination. 55 The extension rule of Parks is thus more analogous than the
waiver rule of Butler.
Although Butler does not appear relevant, application of the full Butler
rule to the instant case would have required the court to consider the ninetyday time allowed. 56 This time period also appears in the Florida rule as a requirement for rebinding the state after an unexcused delay.57 Instead of reaching the ninety-day rule, however, the instant court applied the test of Barker v.
Wingo. Because the Florida rule and Butler provide for cases involving involuntary waiver, the Barker test need never be applied. Application of Barker
is, in effect, a rejection of the Florida rule.
A third point of the dissent, that the majority opinion will have a chilling
effect on defendant's rights, is perhaps the most important. The right of a
defendant to a competency examination is not guaranteed by either the United
States Constitution or the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. 58 The United
States Supreme Court has ruled, however, that conviction of a person incompetent to stand trial violates due process. 59 Florida courts have also ruled that
52. 298 So. 2d at 531.

53.

FLA.

R.CRIM. P. 3.191(C).

54. Id.
55. See note 50 supra. The rule provides that the time limits established for bringing
an accused to trial may be "waived or extended by order of the court." The rule then defines the situations to which the waiver or extension is applicable. One such situation, "a
period of reasonable and necessary delay resulting from proceedings including . . .an examination and hearing to determine . . .mental competency" is defined in 3.191(d)(2)(IV).
The text of the rule is unclear whether the time limit is to be waived for the period necessary to determine competency or whether the time limit is to be extended for that period.
Since waiver is usually considered to be permanent in nature, however, the better reading
seems to be that the time limit is to be extended by the period of delay.
56. See text accompanying notes 49, 51 supra.
57. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(d)(3). The rule states that if continuance or delay is attributable to the accused and is unexcused, the pending motion for discharge shall be
voidable and trial shall commence within 90 days of the date the motion was filed.
58. The constitution does not mention the point. The Florida rules provide for ex-

amination at the discretion of the court. FLA. R.CRIM. P. 3.210(a)(1).
59. Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss2/12

6

Comer: Speedy Trial: Competency Exam as Waiver
1975]

CASE COMMENTS

conviction or execution of an insane person is a violation of his rights.60 The

Florida rules state that a hearing to determine competency is required if
"reasonable ground" for believing the defendant to be insane is present. 61 The
same court that decided the instant case ruled that a hearing is mandatory if
defendant's competency is questionable. 62 The discretion to grant a com-

petency examination is given the trial court,63 and if that court finds no reasonable grounds for believing the defendant insane, it need not grant the examination. A defendant is, however, given the right to move for such an examination under the rule,64 with the resulting delay classified as excused.3
The effect of the majority holding in the instant case is that a defendant must
choose between two rights, the right to a speedy trial and the right to a competency determination. Such a choice must necessarily chill his exercise of one
of them. The fact that a defendant is ultimately declared competent is irrelevant because the trial judge is vested with discretion to deny the motion
for the examination when the defendant is obviously competent to stand trial.
It unduly burdens a defendant to cause him to forego the granted right to a
competency hearing so that he may retain the guaranteed right to a speedy
trial.
Florida's speedy trial rule, only three years old, is very progressive. It is

desigried to protect the rights of defendants in criminal prosecutions while insuring that the interests of society are preserved. The rule specifically avoids
the rigidities of the demand-waiver doctrine by requiring the state to bring an
accused to trial within a specified time even when demand is not made, and by
allowing for certain delays so that other rights of the accused are insured. The
instant holding apparently ignores the rule and partially reinstitutes the demand-waiver doctrine in that any delay attributable to the accused again constitutes a waiver of his right to prompt trial. The United States Supreme Court
rejected the demand-waiver doctrine in Barker. The Supreme Court of Florida
rejected the doctrine in Butler. The Third District Court of Appeal rejected
the doctrine in Parks and the same court should have rejected the doctrine in
the instant case.
PAnucIA E. CoMER

60. See, e.g., Horace v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1959); Perkins v. Mays, 92 So. 2d 641

(Fla. 1957).
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

R. Cium. P. 3.210(a)(1).
Rodriguez v. State, 241 So. 2d 194 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
FLA. R. CarM. P. 3.210(a)(1).
Id.
See note 50 supra.
FLA.
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